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Abstract
Central counterparties (CCPs) are designed to be robust enough to
withstand generally at least the simultaneous default of their largest
two clearing members in extreme but plausible market conditions. This
is called a ’cover 2’ CCP. However, the extreme-and-implausible case
cannot be excluded i.e. where the CCP would exhaust all funded
financial resources (i.e. skin-in-the-game and the default fund D) to
cover the default losses and would need to resort to unfunded recovery
tools.
The aim of this paper is to consider the resilience of a CCP for
both default losses and non-default losses. For the former case, it
is shown under plausible assumptions that the assessment (or cash
call) for the surviving members is sufficient to recover a cover 1 CCP
provided that the total assessment powers under the CCP Rulebook
equals 2D. Given the extreme scenario we also take into account that
some surviving clearing members might decide to leave the CCP. Some
intuitive results for the cover 2 CCP case are provided as well.
For the latter case, it is demonstrated that under plausible assump-
tions, the likelihood that a non-default loss is larger than the CCP’s
capital including one year of profits, is equivalent to an AAA risk.
These observations together provide substantiation for the very low
likelihood of a CCP’s failure.
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1 Introduction
One of the most visible public policy responses to the Lehman crisis is the
mandatory central clearing of over-the-counter derivative transactions. As
a result the business of CCPs worldwide has increased substantially. For
example, interest rate derivatives are now cleared with an average daily
turnover on USD 5 trillion (notional amounts). This naturally leads to the
question how well present-day CCPs are protected.
Central counterparties (CCPs) are designed to be robust enough to with-
stand at least the simultaneous default of their largest two clearing members
in extreme but plausible market conditions. However, the extreme-and-
implausible case cannot be excluded i.e. the scenario that the CCP would
not have enough funded financial resources to cover the loss. Because of
their contractual recovery mechanisms, it is possible for a CCP to allocate
all losses to the surviving clearing members such that eventually no residual
unallocated losses remain for the CCP. Central counterparties are required
by their regulators to have such comprehensive arrangement in place which
is able to fully allocate uncovered credit losses which may remain after one
or more clearing members have been declared in default.1 To achieve this
goal, a CCP cannot only rely on its prefunded financial buffers (margin of
the defaulters, skin-in-the-game and the default fund D). An additional
but unfunded financial buffer is the assessment (or cash call) where each
surviving clearing member is obliged under the CCP Rulebook to provide
additional funds to the CCP. That contribution amounts typically to one,
two or three times the original default fund contribution of each survivor.
The maximum number of assessments under the Rulebook of a CCP will
be denoted by amax. However, the CCP also needs powers in its rulebook
that are comprehensive i.e. such tools can address the excess loss to clearing
members which happen to have a positive mark-to-market portfolio position
(known as variation margin gains haircutting) or by tearing up derivative
contracts to extinguish the loss. In so doing a CCP is able to allocate all
default losses eventually.2
The aim of this article is twofold. First, to analyze the ’end of the pre-
funded waterfall case’ where the default losses are so large that all prefunded
financial buffers of the CCP are exhausted and there is still a residual loss.
Using a simple theoretical model and some basic statistical results from Ex-
treme Value Theory, we derive some qualitative results which are formulated
as observations throughout this paper. Second, to estimate the probability
1See Principle 4 (credit risk), key consideration 7 which reads ”A [CCP] should establish
explicit rules and procedures that address fully any credit losses it may face as a result of
any individual or combined default among its participants ...” in CPMI-IOSCO (2012).
2In FSB (2017), it is stated that the authorities in their consideration to intervene
or not should assume the full application of the CCP’s rules and arrangements for loss
allocation.
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Figure 1: Cleared Volumes of OTC Interest Rate Derivatives 1995- 2019
Source: BIS. Total figures are aggregated across all currencies daily average turnover in USD bn. Centrally
cleared volume share is on IRS notional breakdown by counterparty type (available only from 2016 onwards).
of a non-default loss exceeding the sum of the CCP’s capital and one year
of its profits.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we show the historical
evidence in the literature of CCPs in severe stress. This is ’the end of the
prefunded waterfall case’ described above. Section 3 establishes that the
powers of a CCP under its Rulebook are sufficient to allocate any loss from
member defaults among the surviving clearing members. In section 4 we
study the cover 1 CCP which contains the main results of this paper for the
default losses case. Section 5 considers the non-default loss case which is
rarely studied in the literature. We provide an estimate of how unlikely it
would be for a CCP to burn through the Regulatory Capital Requirement
for non-default losses together with one year of profits. Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical cases of CCPs in severe stress
Mandatory central clearing of standardized OTC transactions has resulted
in large increases of cleared volumes with CCPs (see Figure 1). This nat-
urally raises the issue of the robustness of CCPs. The historical evidence
is presented in Table 1.3 There have been four cases where the CCP itself
experienced severe stress which we define here to mean that the prefunded
waterfall has been exhausted.4 The first two cases involved CCPs that were
3Adopted from Berndsen (2020).
4Some near-misses involving CCPs can be found in (Gregory, 2014, pp. 267-270). Note
that the successful handling of a clearing member default (the main purpose of a CCP)
does not constitute a CCP in severe stress. LCH has managed eight such defaults since
1990.
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not systemically important as they served some specific commodity markets
(in sugar and palm oil) and the solution was liquidation eventually. The
last two cases pertain to systemically important CCPs. The Hong Kong
case was directly related to the largest stock market crash to date (October
1987) which caused a trade suspension of a week. During that time the
solution attained for ending the stress at the CCP was to raise extra funds
from shareholders, in effect comparable to what now would be called an
assessment or cash call. Once trading and clearing was resumed it turned
out that the rescue package was sufficient.5 The New Zealand case involved
fraud and two very large positions.6 Because of the large build-up positions,
the CCP chose for the solution of a partial tear up of the contracts of the
defaulter i.e. it closed out (a compulsory liquidation) the opposing contracts
at a price below the prevailing market prices (Budding et al., 2016).
The relatively short list in Table 1 shows that liquidation of a CCP is
a very rare event and that systemically-important CCPs have not failed to
date. Furthermore, it is important to realize that internationally agreed
minimum standards for CCPs have only been established by central banks
and securities regulators in 2004. After the Lehman default (which CCPs
worldwide were able to manage without recourse to the default fund) the bar
for CCPs has been raised and sharpened standards have been introduced in
2012.7 For example, for credit risk the cover 2 standard has been introduced
as well as more rigorous (reverse) stress-testing requirements. In the EU (but
also in other jurisdictions) the PFMI in the case of CCPs have been put into
law so these are now legally binding.8
3 The End of the CCP Prefunded Loss Waterfall
Notwithstanding the above relatively favorable historical evidence, it is pru-
dent to prepare for the unprecedented.9 In this section, we explore the
scenario where a CCP reaches the end of the prefunded loss waterfall. This
happens when the loss caused by one or more defaults is larger than the size
of the prefunded waterfall. The Rulebook powers of a CCP to handle losses
arising from member defaults(s) have the following characteristics:
• Members are required to post margins bilaterally with the CCP to
cover their risk.
• Members are also required to post a contribution to the Default Fund
(or Guarantee Fund), which the CCP can access if the bilateral mar-
5See Cox (2015) for a thorough analysis of this case.
6One position involved 71 % of the short side of the open interest Budding et al. (2016)
7See Recommendations for Central Counterparties in CPSS-IOSCO (2004) and Prin-
ciples for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) in CPMI-IOSCO (2012).
8The relevant legislation EU/648/2012 is called EMIR.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































gins posted are not enough to cover market losses stemming from a
member default during market stress. In the EU, the default fund is
sized to the cover two i.e. be able to withstand the default of the two
largest clearing members and their affiliates. In this way, members are
said to have mutualized the tail risk through the CCP.
• To properly align incentive structures between clearing members and
the CCP, EMIR requires a layer of capital known as skin in the game
(SITG), which the CCP must use up prior to accessing the default
fund contributions of the non-defaulted members.
• If the combination of bilateral margins, skin in the game and default
fund contributions are not enough to cover the losses due to clear-
ing member defaults the CCP has reached the end of the prefunded
waterfall. From that point onwards, the CCP has powers in its Rule
Book to call additional resources from members equal to a multiple of
member default fund contributions, and, if that is still not enough, by
haircutting Variation Margin (VM) gains to the “winners” while still
requiring the VM payments from the “losers”. This process is called
Variation Margin Gains Haircutting (VMGH).10
• Finally, if all these resources are not enough to meet the losses gener-
ated by the clearing member(s) default, the CCP can tear up the con-
tracts (for foreign exchange and interest rate derivative contracts).11
The consequence of these Rulebook powers taken together leads to the first
result of this paper:
Observation 1 In the event of member default(s), all losses are eventually
allocated if the CCP follows the rulebook allocation “mechanically”.
4 Assessing the Strength of the CCP Waterfall:
the Cover 1 Case
In this section we assess the strength of the prefunded CCP Waterfall by
going through the multiple lines of defence of the CCP.
The first line of defence for the CCP is the membership criteria used
to assess whether a given counterparty is allowed to join the membership.
Clearly the stronger the credit quality of the counterparty, the less likely
they will default and the less likely the CCP waterfall will be used in the
first place. Some CCPs (particularly for OTC derivatives) have very high
10In the case of equity or repo clearing (where VM calling is absent) an alternative loss
arrangement is in place.
11At LCH, clearing members can vote for continuity of the service (“membership bal-
lots”) before tear up.
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credit standards for membership which may be supplemented by requiring
applicants to meet stringent operational capabilities in processing margin
payments several times a day.
The second line of defence for the CCP is the quantum of margin called
from each member. This is paid by the member to cover their cleared
positions and can be seized by the CCP under the Rulebook if the member
is declared in default. The CCP has absolute priority on this margin above
all other creditors of the defaulted member. There are minimum regulatory
standards which require that the margin coverage is set at a high confidence
level. This ensures that if a member defaults, there are sufficient margins
available to cover the loss in most circumstances. In other words, the credit
quality of each member is enhanced by the margin held by the CCP for that
member and the resulting credit rating of the member portfolio is of higher
quality. This level of credit enhancement can be measured. Suppose the
expected counterparty exposure at default is Ecp, the probability of default
is Pd and Lgd denotes the Loss Given Default. Then the expected default
loss E(Ld) equals PdEcpLgd. So for example, if the Loss Given Default is
100% (Lgd = 1) then E(Ld) = PdEcp. If the counterparty posts margin
to a minimum regulatory standard of 99.5% for OTC derivatives (which is
the legal requirement in the EU), then the Expected Default Loss greatly
reduces to
E(Ld) = PdEcp(1− 0.995) (1)
This is equivalent to the expected loss from a unmargined counterparty
with the same exposure Ecp, but with a probability of default equal to 0.005.
So for example, if the counterparty has a credit rating corresponding to CCC,
then S&P published statistics show an empirical probability of default of
about 32% for such a rating.12 The effect of the 99.5% margin is then to
improve the effective counterparty rating (called ’facility rating’)13 to 0.005
x 32% = 0.16% as a new probability of loss for the member portfolio. Now a
Pd of 16 bps is equivalent to a rating in the BBB range, so the overall rating
of the CCC counterparty has been greatly enhanced to a prime expected
Loss rating in the BBB range.
Practically speaking, it is unlikely that members will be admitted to the
CCP if they are rated CCC and near default, as the other healthy members
may object to having standards which would allow this. A more likely
situation is when the healthy member has a B rating, as would be found
in lower rated economies. According to S&P, a B rating has an empirical
default rate of about 5%, so the credit enhancement of the 99.5% margin is
.005 x 5% = 2.5 bps. This is firmly in the AAA to AA+ high prime rating
12Default, Transition and Recovery: 2019 Annual Global Corporate Default and Rating
Transition Study, S&P Global.
13Here the facility rating refers to the credit rating including the collateral pledged to
the CCP
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band i.e. the probability of loss from a member default (regardless of the
member rating) is very low and is equivalent to a high prime rating.
Observation 2 The minimum regulatory standards for CCP margin re-
quirements enhance the facility rating of a cleared member portfolio to a
prime rating equivalent.
The third line of defence in the CCP Waterfall is the ’Skin In The Game’
(SITG). This is the amount of CCP Capital which must be used directly af-
ter the defaulted members resources, but before any non-defaulted member
resources are exposed. It exists to align the incentives of CCP manage-
ment and CCP membership and to encourage the CCP to put in place
policies/procedures to ensure that margin levels are adequate. It is particu-
larly effective as an alignment mechanism if linked directly to compensation.
Generally, the quantum of SITG held by CCPs is not large and there is an
active debate as to whether it should be increased substantially. This is dis-
cussed in McLaughlin (2018), where it is shown that a mandatory increase
in regulatory requirements for SITG would eventually result in the CCP
being unable to return the cost of capital. This in turn would result in the
withdrawal of private funding from CCPs and leave public funding as the
only viable option, unless there was to be a substantial increase in clearing
fees across the industry to compensate. For the purposes of this discussion,
the SITG layer will be ignored as it does not contribute substantially to loss
absorbing capital in the CCP Waterfall under current regulations.
The fourth line of defence in the CCP Waterfall is the Default Fund
(aka Guarantee Fund). This comes directly after SITG is exhausted. The
Default Fund is constructed from member contributions which are pooled
and held by the CCP to be used in the event that losses from member
defaults exceed bilateral margins posted by the defaulters plus the SITG. It
is in effect mutualizing the tail losses resulting from extreme but plausible
market scenarios. The Default Fund is fully funded in cash. Hence by
construction, the Default Fund in a Cover 1 CCP will fully cover the default
of the member with the largest exposure to the CCP in the most extreme
but plausible scenario. By definition this is the cost to liquidate the member
portfolio in the most extreme but plausible market scenario net of all margins
posted by the member.
If the Default Fund has been partly or wholly consumed to address the
resulting loss after a member default, each surviving clearing member must
make a formal decision to either: Replenish the Default Fund and continue
membership, or leave the CCP altogether.14 If the decision of the clearing
14There may also be a formal ballot by the membership to determine whether in aggre-
gate the CCP needs to “wind down”, but this will not be considered here as a separate
capital buffer is already explicitly held to absorb such wind-down cost. In addition, for sys-
temically important CCPs wind down is usually not preferred because of the systemic risk
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member is to retain membership and not to exit the CCP then it will be re-
quired to post another contribution to replenish the Default Fund. Typically
the member contribution to the Default Fund (D) is determined by the risk
brought to the CCP and a reasonable assumption here is that this contribu-
tion for each member is given by the proportion of margin requirements for
member i. Other such risk-based allocation schemes are also possible, but
here we focus on this simple scheme as it adequately illustrates the essential
arguments to be made. If there are N members in the CCP at the outset,
then the replenishment of the Default Fund will fall to the surviving N − 1
members. A new Default Fund in the cover 1 CCP will be sized to the
uncovered loss of the second largest member and this could be quite close to
(but slightly less than) the uncovered loss of the first member who defaulted.
In other words, D will remain a conservative assumption for the size of the
new Default Fund, but this time it needs to be allocated out among the
remaining N -1 survivors. This means that for the replenishment, member i




where the sum is taken over all N − 1 surviving members and Mi is the
margin requirement for member i. If there are many members this number
will be approximately equal to the original Default Fund contribution. More
precisely, Mi is some historic margin average requirement as Default Funds
are only rebalanced periodically (e.g. monthly) but this subtlety will not
be pursued here. In summary, a severe member default in a Cover 1 CCP
will mean that each member’s original (prefunded) contribution will be con-
sumed and will then need to replenish for an amount almost equal to its
original default contribution, but at least the member will have the choice
to retain membership of the CCP, or have a say in whether it continues
operations before replenishing.
So far, the discussion has concerned the protection afforded by the funded
part of the Loss Waterfall. However the possibility must also be considered
that in an extreme but plausible scenario, there is a common shock to clear-
ing members which could it make more likely that another member might
also default. If this were to happen in a Cover 1 CCP, the Default Fund
might be fully depleted after addressing the loss from the first default. The
CCP would then have no choice but to resort to calling for potentially two
further assessments under the Rulebook. The maximum number of poten-
tial assessments (amax) is limited in the Rulebook to a small multiple of
the original Default Fund contribution. So, the first assessment as discussed
above is to replenish the fund from the default of the first member. The
implications so the CCP will most likely be put into resolution by a competent Resolution
Authority.
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second assessment is to cover the loss due to the default of the second mem-
ber which was not covered by prefunded,in-house funds. Again it is possible
that the uncovered loss from the second member default could be close to
(but slightly less than) D if both defaulting members had uncovered losses
of comparable size. In this most conservative case, a surviving member
will have lost their original Default Fund contribution and be called for two





where the sum is now over the N − 2 surviving members. As the unfunded
assessment is now larger if the member were to continue in the CCP, it is less
likely to be honoured than in the case of a single default, where the loss was
pre-funded and the member had a choice of whether to exit. A member not
meeting a contractual assessment under the Rulebook would be considered
an event of default at the CCP. In that event, the repudiating member
would be declared in Default of the CCP Rulebook and the assessment owed
would be added to the total loss to be allocated out among the remaining
N − 3 surviving members, thereby marginally increasing their assessment
owed. More generally, if k > 0 members were to repudiate the call for
assessments to meet the uncovered resources (≈ D) from the default of
the second large member, the amount not collected would be added to the
resources to be allocated out among the surviving N − 2 − k members.
However, this additional amount to be allocated will be a smaller order of
magnitude than the original amount D. So that addressing the default of
the second large member in a Cover 1 CCP involves an element of credit
risk, as the full uncovered loss required may not in fact be collected. If there
is a large number of members, this absorption process will work without
difficulty for two basic reasons. First, there will be many surviving members
with a vested interest in continuing with membership of the CCP, so it would
not be in danger of a wind down. Second, as the missing assessments from
the relatively small number of members who repudiated the call is of an
order of magnitude smaller than the total requirement to be filled (≈ D),
and will be allocated out over a relatively large number of survivors thereby
increasing their assessment only marginally to compensate. In summary,
the result is:
Observation 3 In a Cover 1 CCP with many members and amax ≥ 2, the
simultaneous default of two large members can be absorbed by assessments
on the survivors without going to VMGH.
For a better understanding of this Observation it is instructive to consider
when this loss absorption from the second member default might fail in a
Cover 1 CCP. From the above discussion, a failure will be linked to a small
membership (small N), for in that case there is potentially less interest
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in the surviving members keeping the CCP operational for future clearing
services and in dealing with the relatively large costs which will only be
shared among very few survivors. For example, suppose that the number
of members in the Cover 1 CCP service initially is N=4. If two were then
to default simultaneously, that would only leave two survivors to share the
losses. For simplicity suppose that the members are of approximate equal
size (homogeneous CCP assumption). As discussed above, the first default is
fully covered by the (funded) Default Fund of size D, so that each surviving
member will lose D/4 in original contribution. The loss from the second
member default is also ≈ D and the two survivors would then need to
contribute an amount of D/2 if this was to be covered. In other words, they
would need to contribute double their original default fund contribution to
absorb the loss (2D). If the two survivors were to agree to continue clearing
operations, this would require a new Default Fund of approximate size D,
and each survivor would need to contribute D/2. The costs on surviving
members are then as follows:
1. If the survivors chose to continue as members in good standing at the
CCP, the total cost to each survivor is approx. an order of magni-
tude equal to the initial Default Fund size prior to default of the two
members: D/4 +D/2 +D/2 = 54D
2. If one survivor decides not to continue clearing, the CCP will fail as
it cannot function with only one surviving member. The cost to each
member is then: D/4 +D/2 = 34D
3. If one survivor decides to repudiate the assessment call, then the CCP
will not survive for future operations and the cost to the surviving
member in good stead would need to be D/4 + D to compensate for
the unmet assessment of D/2 on the other member. But this would
mean an assessment of four times the original default fund contribution
on a surviving member which given that amax is usually smaller than
four, would not be allowed to assess this much from a member under
the CCP Rulebook.
Even if case 1. prevails and the CCP were to continue clearing operations,
this is not a stable situation and is effectively equivalent to the mechanism of
bilateral margining without a CCP. Case 2. might cause Regulatory concern
if the Competent Authorities felt that a cleared market solution was required
and that bilateral trading as the only functioning trading mechanism was
against the public interest. Case 3 is the most interesting. In the other
cases a market price can be established as there are two functioning market
participants left, but one of the participants is not in good standing and has
repudiated its obligations to the CCP and effectively to the other remaining
member. If the CCP were able to mark the positions to market, then the
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required resources could be raised from the mechanism of VMGH. But that
works only as long as the portfolio of the repudiating member remains in
profit. If it were in a loss position, then under the CCP Rulebook, the only
option left is full contract tear-up. But this only allocates the loss to the
surviving member who did not repudiate the CCP assessment. In this case,
the Resolution Authority would have to intervene to resolve the situation
following the No Creditor Worse Principle and this would result in the loss
being forced back onto the repudiating member in the end. Hence, a CCP
can absorb losses from several members defaulting without applying VMGH
and contract tear-ups so long as the total quantum of default losses Ld to be
assessed against surviving members (after using the Default Fund) does not
exceed the assessment powers in the CCP Rulebook (amax rounds of default
fund contributions).
We now can establish the strength of the waterfall for a cover 1 CCP
with no repudiating members as follows. Assume the cover 1 CCP has N
homogeneous members, Default Fund size D, with each member having the
same ratio of Default Fund contribution DN and no repudiating members. If
n members were to default then the resources over and above the amount D
held which is needed to handle the uncovered loss is approximately (n−1)D
and this will be less than the amount N−nN D available for assessments on
survivors as long as n ≤ 2NN+1 .
15 This fraction is very close to amax for a
sizeable membership (large N), so if no surviving member repudiates the
assessment call, then the CCP can cover the losses from a second member
default provided that amax ≥ 2.
Subsequently, we show the strength of the waterfall where we relax the
assumption of no repudiators. So assuming k > 0 repudiators we arrive at
the following conclusion:
Observation 4 In a Cover 1 homogeneous CCP of N members with Default
Fund D, n members in default, and k members who repudiate the CCP
assessments, the total assessments then paid up would be (N−n−k)DN . This
CCP would not have to resort to VMGH if this number was greater than the
uncovered loss (n−1)D, which would be the case as long as n ≤ 2N−k)N+1 . This
is approximately 2 + kN+1 and for large enough membership N would be very
close to two. Since (n − 1)D was a conservative estimate for the resources
required to cure the loss, these assessments raised would be enough for the
CCP to handle the loss without resorting to VMGH under an extreme but
plausible market scenario.
Of course if the CCP were to handle the loss without resorting to VMGH, it
could pursue the repudiating members by declaring them in default of the
CCP Rulebook, seize any positive Variation Gains and if none are available
pursue the repudiating member in the courts for the monies owed. This




result implicitly assumes that the Default Fund has been sized and modelled
correctly in the first place to cover the worst extreme but plausible exposure.
All these arguments can be adapted to a Cover 2 CCP with a sizeable
membership base, where the Default Fund is sized to cover the maximum
exposure to the CCP from the default of two members under an extreme but
plausible market scenario, but the arguments involve advanced statistics and
are beyond the scope of this paper. However, a Cover 2 CCP by definition,
has a stronger prefunded waterfall than a Cover 1 CCP, so the above results
hold as a special case.
The assumption that the CCP is homogeneous can be removed and a
more general statement is possible. Again suppose the CCP is cover 1 with
N members and n defaults and k repudiations. Then the loss which must
be covered is again (n− 1)D, but in the heterogeneous case the assessments
available from survivors could be a lot less as there may be concentrations
among the defaulters. If the n defaulted members had contributed the frac-
tion q of the original Default Fund, the CCP would contractually be able
to raise 2(1 − q)D from the remaining N − n members. Suppose amax = 2
then this would be enough to cover the loss provided q ≤ (3−n)/2. For two
defaults in the CCP, n = 2 and this inequality is manifestly true as long
as these two defaulters do not together contribute more than 50% to the
original Default Fund.
Next if the k repudiating members had an original Default Fund contri-
bution of q′, this inequality would be modified slightly to read that the CCP
powers of two assessments are enough to absorb the loss of the n defaulting
members, so long as q + q′ ≤ (3 − n)/2. For n = 2 defaults, this is true as
long as q + q′ together are less than 50%. Otherwise the CCP must resort
to other powers such as VMGH or contract tear-ups. In summary, this dis-
cussion shows that the ability of the CCP to handle the default of any two
members is linked to the extent of the concentration inside the CCP:
Observation 5 For a heterogeneous Cover 1 CCP, the default of any two
members under the worst extreme but plausible market scenario can be cov-
ered by the maximum of two assessments under the CCP Rulebook powers
and the CCP can avoid VMGH and contract tear-ups altogether so long as
the two defaulters and the assessment repudiators do not together contribute
more than 50% of the original Default Fund.
Each member should have planned and set aside capital to reserve against
the maximum number of CCP assessments, so the risk of repudiations should
not be material. This result identifies when the Cover 1 CCP might enter
the VMGH stage of the Loss Waterfall, linking this to the degree of con-
centrations, the number of defaulters, the number of assessments allowed
under the CCP Rulebook and the number of repudiators. But the result
highlights that if the CCP has many members, is not very concentrated and
has two assessment powers, it is very unlikely to enter into the VMGH phase
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of the Loss Waterfall in the event that there are two defaults; the first de-
fault is covered by the existing Default Fund, the second default is covered
by the first assessment and the Default Fund is reconstituted by a second
assessment. If there are 3 simultaneous defaults in the CCP taking place
under extreme but plausible conditions there will likely be no resources left
(funded or unfunded) to meet the resulting loss and the CCP will need to
impose VMGH. At this point, a surviving member will have lost the origi-
nal default fund contribution and paid two more default fund contributions
and will also have suffered a VMGH loss. It is unlikely that such a member
would want to continue membership in the CCP and it is very likely that the
CCP will be discontinued, with all contracts being torn up. Summarizing,
this gives a sense of the strength of the Loss Waterfall:
Observation 6 A cover 1 CCP having many members, no dominant con-
centrations and amax assessment powers, will likely exhaust the entire pre-
funded Loss Waterfall in an extreme but plausible market scenario in the
event that amax members default with uncovered loss of approximately amax
times the original default fund.
5 Non Default Losses
We have seen so far in this paper that losses due to member defaults can
be allocated back to surviving members through the CCP Loss Waterfall
and have discussed the strength of this mechanism. The natural remaining
question is what about losses that are not due to member defaults, the so
called non-default losses (Lnd). By very definition, these are not covered
by the CCP Waterfall and cannot be allocated back to members without
prior agreement and so they are to be ultimately covered by CCP Capital.
Non-default losses are rarely studied16. They can broadly be classified as
follows:
Investment Losses Here the activity of “storing” member margins posted
to cover member defaults can give rise to Market Risk for the CCP; for
example, under the EMIR regulatory constraints, a CCP is unable to
store (on average) more than 5% of margins in unsecured deposits with
commercial banks, and due to liquidity concerns is also not allowed
to use Money Market Funds. If the CCP does not have access to
the Central Bank relevant for the particular cash margin, this leaves
only the options to buy bonds outright or reverse repo the cash to a
commercial counterparty. Of course there will be tight liquidity and
credit standards inside the CCP for which type of repo counterparties
are allowable and for the liquidity and credit quality of the underlying
bonds. However, it will still be the case that such a CCP will be
16Two exceptions are LCH (2014) and Lewis and McPartland (2017).
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(reluctantly) exposed to Investment Risk on these activities. This
shows in particular the key role that a Central Bank account can play
in reducing this risk.
ICSD Failures When margin is posted in securities, they must be stored
at a custodian and there is a risk they cannot be recovered when
required if the ICSD fails. This will be more a liquidity risk rather
than a solvency risk as the margins are legally segregated and will
eventually be recovered.
Operational or Business Failures This covers a wide variety of loss types
including those from cyber attacks, potential litigations, fraud, or IT
system failures.
Under EMIR, Regulators capitalize explicitly for non-default losses. Cur-
rently they require a charge of 15% of annual net revenues (Rn) calculated
as the average of the past 3 years annual figures. This is intended to be
a conservative proxy for coverage up to a high quantile (99.9%) of the loss
distribution. In other words, a 1 in a thousand chance (or .001) serves as a
proxy for the probability of experiencing a non-default loss larger than the
requirement (Pr(Lnd > .15Rn)). Moreover a CCP would typically report
profit margins around 50%, so the annual profit of the CCP would be of
the order magnitude of .5Rn. So now consider a significant CCP with $500
million of net revenues. The regulatory capital charge is then $75 million
(15%) and the order of magnitude of annual profit is $250 million under the
above assumptions. It is known theoretically by Extreme Value Theory, e.g.
De Koker (2006), that losses at high confidence levels in excess of some large
enough threshold U will follow a Pareto Law, with linear tail growth given
asymptotically by:
Pr(LossX > U) ≈ C.X−α (4)
for some constant α. In a recent paper (McLaughlin, 2020) it is argued
that the parameter p:= 1α is about 0.78 for a wide range of firm size and is
consistent with heavy tails of the severity distribution as one might expect.
This is also consistent with Moscadelli (2004), where the index is estimated
for various business activities. If the regulatory capital requirement is in-
terpreted at 99.9%, this is certainly a high confidence level and equation 4
would then give:
Pr(Loss > RegCap) = .001 ≈ C · (RegCap)−1.28 (5)
And using Reg Cap = .15 ·Rn, allows to solve for C as
C = .001(.15 ·Rn)1.28 = $12.48million = 0.02496 ·Rn (6)
This value of C can then be used in equation 4 to answer the critical question:
What is the probability of observing an NDL in excess of the CCP annual
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profits and the Regulatory Capital actually held? In other words we must
calculate
Pr(LossX > (.5·Rn+.15·Rn)) ≈ 12.480, 000·(0.65·Rn)−1.28 = .000153 (7)
In other words, an NDL loss event which exhausts both the Regulatory
Capital held by the CCP and the annual profits held by the CCP has a
very rare chance of occurring of about 1.5bps. This is considered AAA risk
equivalent according to the Rating Agencies and is even under the Basel
floor of 3bps. To summarize, this is really a statement on the Resilience of
a CCP to NDLs:
Observation 7 Assuming the power law implicit in the current Regulatory
Capital Framework, the risk that a CCP might incur an NDL in excess of
Regulatory Capital held which also wipes out one year of profits, is a AAA
risk, whose likelihood of occurrence is approximately 1.5bps.
Note that this result agrees with the earlier empirical observation in
Table 1 that there has been only 2 CCP failures due to a non-default loss
(with fraud as the root cause) in 50 years which is a frequency of 2 chances
in 255 days x 50 years = 2 chances in 12,750 days or approx 1.5bps.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has recalled the main historical events where CCPs have got into
severe stress, defined as the exhaustion of the prefunded default waterfall
of a CCP. This is a rare event in itself and there have been no instances of
a systemically-important CCP itself defaulting to date. We argue that this
is due to the various lines of defence which are legally required and which
have been raised to a higher bar following the Lehman crisis. This paper
contributes to the CCP literature in two ways.
On default losses, we derive a number of observations regarding the
strength of the waterfall for a Cover 1 CCP.17 We show how the margining
process improves the credit quality of any clearing member to a prime rat-
ing equivalent, decreasing the likelihood of a clearing member in the first
place. In addition, we derive under plausible assumptions that two assess-
ments (cash calls) are sufficient to cover the simultaneous default of two large
members. In case there are assessment repudiating members (i.e. clearing
members which cannot or do not deliver the extra funds) this changes to
the condition that the two defaulters plus the assessment repudiators con-
tributed no more than half of the original default fund.
On non-default losses, we show that a CCP is resilient to non-default
losses. Based on some insights from Extreme Value theory, we show that
17To derive the results for a Cover 2 would require advanced statistics which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
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the probability of a non-default loss exceeding the sum of regulatory capital
and one year of profit amounts to 1.5 bps, a rare event equivalent to a prime
rating risk.
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